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Notes
THE BASES AND RANGE OF FEDERAL MARITIME LAW:
INDICIA OF MARITIME COMPETENCE
I.

INTRODUCTION

Forasmuch as a great and common Clamor and Complaint hath been
oftentimes made before this Time, and yet is, for that the Admirals and
their Deputies hold their Sessions ... in prejudice of our Lord the King, and
the common Law of the Realm,. . . it is accorded and assented, That the
Admirals and their Deputies shall not meddle from henceforth of anything
done within the Realm, but only of a Thing done upon the Sea .. .
The Constitution 2 and federal statutes of the United States
establish three forms of jurisdiction for the federal judiciary-diversity,3 federal question, 4 and admiralty and maritime.' This scheme of
multibased jurisdiction necessarily raises a fundamental problem in
our federal judicial system: the interrelation of these grants of power.
6
Mr. Justice Story, the author of the opinion in Swift v. Tyson,
viewed the grants of diversity, federal question, and maritime
competence as complementary, and utilized this concept in an
attempt to create a uniform body of federal commercial common
law.7 In Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins,8 however, the Supreme
1. Statute of 1389, 13 Rich. 2, c. 5.
2. U.S. CONST. art. m, § 2, cl. 1.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970). See also RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS §
7, comment a at 41 (1942).
The Restatement uses the term "competency"; the majority of common law
courts, however, speak in terms of "subject matter jurisdiction." "Competency" is
a term borrowed from the civil law system in which jurisdiction defects are
considered procedural and, therefore, usually curable. A. EHIRENZWEIG, A
TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 73 (1962). In a common law
jurisdiction, however, an "incompetent" court cannot render a valid judgment.
See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 7, comment a at 41 (1942). See also
Cleary, The Length of the Long Arm, 9 J. PUB. L. 293, 296 (1960); Ehrenzweig,
Ehrenzweig in Reply, 9 J. PUB. L. 328, 334-36 (1960). While the reader may
consider the use of civil law terms appropriate in any discussion of admiralty, the
use of the civil verbalization is intended to stress the organizational aspect of the
use of power by the judiciary. See generally Smit, The Terms Jurisdiction and
Competence in Comparative Law, 10 AM. J. CoMp. L. 164 (1961).
6. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
7. Currie, Federalismand the Admiralty: "The Devil's Own Mess," 1960 SuP.
CT. REV. 158, 160.
8. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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Court rejected the principle that the federal courts could "apply the
traditional common-law technique of decision" 9 to create a uniform
body of federal commercial common law without a specific pronouncement from Congress. Nonetheless, the Erie decision did not
result in a collateral retraction of federal maritime competence or in a
limitation of the Court's power to develop the body of federal
maritime law. 10
General maritime law embraces a framework of decisional law that
is distinct and separate from that of the common law. For example, in
Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn" the Court held the right to recover for
unseaworthiness to be "rooted in federal maritime law." 12 In
addition, the breach of a maritime duty resulting in death gives rise to
a cause of action under the general federal maritime law. 13 If the
conduct of which a party complains is within the maritime competence of the federal court, the "legal rights and liabilities arising
from that conduct... [are measured] by the standard of maritime
law [and] [i]f [the] action [has] been brought in a state court,
reference to admiralty law would [be] necessary to determine the
rights and liabilities of the parties." 14

9. D'Oench, Duhme & Co., Inc. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447,
472 (1942).
10. See, e.g., Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 409 (1970).
See also Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920), in which the
Court indicated the source of federal judicial power to develop a body of federal
maritime law: "The Constitution itself adopted and established, as a part of the
laws of the United States, approved rules of the general maritime law ... ."253
U.S. at 160. See Recent Development, 6 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 224 (1972).
Whether the Court by interpreting the constitutional grant, the Congress by
enacting specific legislation, or the President by exercising his foreign relations
power can limit the federal judiciary's power to maintain the "seasoned body" of
general maritime law remains problematical. In practice, however, the Court is the
sole arbiter of its own competence in maritime affairs. See Romero v.
International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 375-77 (1959); cf. The
Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851); The
Steamboat Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825). See also Wilburn
Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955); G. GILMORE & C.
BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 43-46 (1957).
11. 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
12. 346 U.S. at 409.
13. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 409 (1970).
14. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 628
(1959) (citations omitted). See also Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314, 327, 328
n.9 (1960) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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In 1950, before the amendment of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure eliminated the admiralty side of the federal bench," s
Professor Black described federal maritime competence as follows:
[It is] a matter of interest and concern for at least two main reasons. First
in general appeal, though probably not in practical importance, the
institution of the maritime court must in itself be an experiment of interest;
it constitutes the only major attempt in our law to set up a separate judicial
tribunal, even in the attenuated form of the "side of court," for the policing
of a single industry. It

is [a] ... repudiation

of the fundamental

idea... that judicial proceedings and rules of law ought to be as nearly as
possible the same regardless of the nature of the concerns to which they are
applied. True, this repudiation is in greatest part a matter of substance, and
hence the maritime law rather than the court of admiralty constitutes the
most significant differentiating factor.... [T]he administrative segregation
of the admiralty side.., aided in keeping clear and undiluted the specific
characteristics of the maritime law....
Secondly,... the relevant constitutional provision recognizes with the
clarity of necessary implication that the United States has a deep national
concern in the business of navigation and shipping upon the high seas and
upon the lakes and rivers of the country, and declares that that concern is to
be expressed and made articulate primarily through the judicial branch of
the federal government. This national interest is... in the control and
regulation of a complex of affairs. The jurisdiction which is the means of
articulation of this interest ought to be shaped
and its parts so distributed as
16
best to serve the practical interest itself.

15. The admiralty side of the federal judiciary was "veiled in mystical words,
phrases, rules and forms of practice which no outsider could confidently
penetrate." Crutcher, Imaginary Chair Removed from the United States Courthouse; or, What Have They Done to Admiralty?, 5 WILLAMETTE L. J. 367, 375
(1969). As the dissenters in Romero indicated, the entire question whether
maritime competence is federal question competence is "whether a few more
seamen can have their suits for damages passed on by federal juries instead of
judges." 358 U.S. at 388 (Black, J., dissenting). Subsequently, in Fitzgerald v.
United States Lines, 374 U.S. 16 (1963), the Court concluded that Jones Act,
unseaworthiness, and maintenance and cure claims should all be given to the jury.
Coupled with the merger of federal civil and federal admiralty rules and the
availability of pendent jurisdiction for federal and state claims, the Fitzgerald
clean-up doctrine should present an even more compelling basis for evaluating
maritime competence as a choice of law rather than a choice of forum problem.
See ALI, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE
AND FEDERAL COURTS, at 226-27 (1968) [hereinafter cited as ALI,
FEDERAL COURTS].

16. Black, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Critique and Suggestions, 50 COLUM. L.
REV. 259, 260-61 (1950) (footnotes omitted).
Vol. 6-No. 1
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A claim of federal maritime competence over a particular
case-regardless of whether such competence is predicated on the
Constitution "7 or on 28 U.S.C. § 1333-presents a choice more of
applicable law than of competent forum. The court must decide
whether maritime competence exists through a determination of the
applicable body of law. 1' As a practical matter, however, the scope of
federal maritime competence, as distinguished from that of diversity
jurisdiction or federal question competence, can be best articulated as
a set of conceptual parameters drawn to effectuate the policy
considerations and balance the interests between uniform and nonuniform regulation of the commercial maritime industry. These policy
considerations and interests, therefore, determine whether maritime
competence exists, and the court is presented with a choice of law
question to decide a choice of law problem. 1' The vast majority of
cases, however, are not "borderline cases on jurisdiction;... the main
business of the court involves claims for cargo damage, collision,
well and comfortably within the
seamen's injuries and the like--all 20
circle, and far from the penumbra."
17. The Constitution extends the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal
courts to "all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 2, cl. 1. Congress has implemented this provision, giving the district courts
"original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of: ... [a]ny civil case
of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other
remedies to which they are otherwise entitled." 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970).
18. In a maritime case the court will apply federal decisional and statutory
maritime law. See cases cited note 10 supra. See also A. EHRENZWEIG,
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 196-204 (1967). This federal law will include

the applicable maritime choice of law rule, which may point to the maritime law
of a foreign country. See, e.g., A.*EHRENZWEIG, supra,at 219-23. In the famous

"maritime but local" exception to uniform treatment of cases arising under
federal maritime law, the common law of a state may be selected as controlling.
See, e.g., Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955). In a
diversity case, the court will apply state decisional and statutory law. Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304- U.S. 64 (1938). In a federal question case, the court will apply
federal decisional and statutory law. See generally Friendly, In Praise of
Erie-And the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 383 (1964).
19. The initial choice of law problem is whether the federal or state forum
will apply federal maritime law including maritime choice of law. The second
choice of law problem is whether the forum sitting in admiralty will apply the
substantive rules of maritime law or the maritime choice of law rules. If the court
adopts the latter and selects state common law a renvoi type situation has
developed which, in reality, amounts to no more than an exercise to choose a
"choice of law" law.
20. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 10, at 24 n.88; accord ALI,
FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 15, Commentary § 1316(a) at 230.
Fall, 1972
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The bases and range of "the main business of the court"
nonetheless provide a conceptual foundation for determining what
kinds of cases can be characterized appropriately as maritime for
purposes of the competence or subject matter jurisdiction of the
court. Competence to hear a cause does not mean that there is, in fact,
a cause of action. 2 Rather, the bases and range of the causes of
action collaterally define the competence of the court to hear certain
kinds of causes of action, or any kind of cause of action between
certain parties. Furthermore, an examination of the kinds of cases
over which a court has subject matter jurisdiction is helpful in
delineating the policy reasons behind the existence of the court's
power to adjudicate those cases.
This mutually definitional interaction between a court's competence and the kinds of cases it hears may be less apparent in a
common law system than in a civil law system. For example, in the
recent case of Tresor Public c. Galakis the Cour de Cassation reviewed
a decision in which the Court of Appeal had considered "whether [a]
rule, enacted for internal contracts, should be applied as well to
international contracts made to suit the needs of, and under
conditions conforming to the usages of, maritime commerce ....

2

The Cour de Cassation held that "the judgment [of the Court of
Appeal was] justly that the rule denying validity does not apply to
such a contract."2 3 Since the 1920's, the Cour de Cassation has
regarded the special requirements of international commerce to be
determined by French municipal law, including the commercial code
and the jurisprudence.24 Regardless of whether there exists a rule of
international maritime law independent of municipal law, 25 however,
the French Court has explicitly stated that the "needs of. . . maritime
commerce" demand special consideration, and it implicitly recognized
in Tresor that the function of the Court of Appeal is to provide,
whenever appropriate, a forum in which the needs and usages of
21. See, e.g., Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. at
359.
22. TrsorPublic c. Galakis, [1966] D.Jur. 575, [1966] J.C.P. II 14798 (Cass.
Civ. ire).
23. Id.
24. Batiffol, Arbitration Clauses Concluded between French GovernmentOwned Enterprises and Foreign Private Parties, 7 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.

32, 35 (1968).
25. Batiffol, supra note 24, at 37-38, 44. See Etat Frangais c. Comit6 de la
Bourse d'Amsterdam (affaire de l'emprunt des Messageries Maritimes), [19511 D.
Jur. 749, [1950] J.C.P. II 5812 (Cass. Civ. Ire). See also Cheatham, Conflict of
Laws: Some Developments and Some Questions, 25 ARK. L. REv. 9, 19 (1971).
Vol. 6-No. 1
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maritime commerce can be articulated and properly-i.e. separatelyconsidered. Whether the court is competent to render a decision in a
particular case regarding the needs and usages of maritime commerce
depends on whether the particular case concerns those needs. If it
does, the court is competent to provide a forum to the parties. By
inquiring into the bases and range of maritime usage, a pragmatic and
practical means of identifying a court's competence in a particular
case is available to both bench and bar. 26
In comparison, the courts 27 and commentators 28 in the United
States tend to equate the question whether a court has maritime
competence in a particular case with the question whether the needs
of maritime commerce require the application of a uniform interstate
body of law. In addition, United States courts often confuse the
question whether maritime competence exists with the question
whether the complaint has stated a cause of action. 29 When will a
court apply federal maritime law, including federal maritime choice of
law rules, which indicate the body of law that has the most significant
contact with the case? The simple answer is that the court is
competent to hear a maritime 30 cause of action when the plaintiff
asserts a maritime claim.

26. Cf. Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE,
L. J. 457, 485-86 (1924).
27. See, e.g., Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917). This point
is discussed further at pp. 214-22 infra.
28. See, e,g., Currie, supra note 7, at 160; Stevens, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins and
the Uniform GeneralMaritime Law, 64 HARV. L. REV. 246, 249-50 (1950).
29. See, e.g., Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354
(1959). Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court in Romero, remarked:
"'As frequently happens where jurisdiction depends on subject matter, the
question whether jurisdiction exists has been confused with the question whether
the complaint states a cause of action.' Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v.
Northwestern Public Service Co., 341 U.S. 246, 249. Petitioner asserts a
substantial claim that the Jones Act affords him a right of recovery for the
negligence of his employer. Such assertion alone is sufficient to empower the
District Court to assume jurisdiction over the case and determine whether, in fact,
the Act does provide the claimed rights." 358 U.S. at 359.
30. Characterization itself is a choice of law method. See R. LEFLAR,
AMERICAN

CONFLICTS LAW

140 (1968). The question whether a court is

competent to apply its own law, including its choice of law rules, has not only
been resolved by federal courts sitting in admiralty by the use of the
characterization device, but also by federal courts seeking to determine whether
to apply various other federal laws in a case. R. LEFLAR, supra, at 42. See also A.
EHRENZWEIG, supra note 5, at 327-28.
Fall, 1972
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Professor Leflar has submitted that "[a]ny case whose facts
occurred in one or more than one state or nation, so that in deciding
the case it is necessary to make a choice between the relevant laws of
the different states or countries, is a conflicts case." "' As a matter of
terminology, the choice between relevant federal and state laws may
be characterized as a vertical conflict of laws problem, while the
choice among relevant federal laws, or among relevant state laws, may
be characterized as horizontal. In either case, the only constitutional
limit on the power of the forum to select its own law is that the forum
must have a "sufficiently substantial contact with the activity in
question." 32
The classic tradition in maritime conflict of laws has been the use
of the characterization device-e.g., the "maritime" tort and the
"maritime" contract. " The development of the most significant
relationship test-or center of gravity and grouping of contacts--has
effectively replaced the classic test, 14 but also has been sharply
criticized. " Further modifications of the focus of the test have
resulted in the policy-weighing, or interest-weighing, approach to the
choice of law.36 Additional refinement of this approach has led
Professor Currie to develop the governmental interests theory as a
means of analyzing the forum's interest or concern with the facts in
relation to its law. 11 Regardless of the style of the approach or test
which a judge or commentator adopts,
[t] he history of choice of law is determined by two major themes: the
changing relations between the rule of the forum and those foreign rules
invoked to displace it; and the changing impact, on ideology and practice,
of. .. the existence and ... fiction of a super law. 38
As a reflection of the status of current conflicts developments,
Professors Reese and Cheatham enumerated in order of priority the
31. R.

LEFLAR,

supra note 30, at 3.

32. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 15 (1962). See
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 9 (1971).

RESTATEMENT

33. See De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418 (no. 3,776) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815).
See also Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1 (1870); Atlantic Transport
Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52 (1944).
34. See Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in
Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1233 (1963).
35. See Currie, supra note 34, at 1237; A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 5, at
464.
36. See R. LEFLAR, supra note 30, at 137, 222-23.
37. Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Government Interests
and the JudicialFunction, 26 U. CHI. L. REv. 9 (1958).
38. A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 18, at 196 (footnotes omitted).
Vol. 6-No. 1
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factors useful in solving a choice of law problem. 11 Professor Leflar,
without priority considerations, reduced these factors to a manageable
number and listed them as follows:
(a) predictability of results;
(b) maintenance of interstate and international order;
(c) simplification of the judicial task;
(d) advancement of the forum's governmental interests;
(e) application of the better rule of law. 40
The first, third and fifth considerations directly concern the persons
involved in the case-the parties, their lawyers and the judge. The
second and fourth considerations refer to the development of an
international legal order and the interests of the forum government in
41
relating its policies and legal order to the international legal order.
If maritime law is unique among types of federal decisional and
statutory law, 4 2 as the Supreme Court indicated in Romero and Pope
& Talbot, 11 the bases and range of this corpus juris maritime should
provide a set of conceptual parameters useful in determining the
situations in which the federal government's interests in maritime
affairs will require the application of a body of federal law. An inquiry
into the bases and range of maritime law must be made with a view to
functionality; rules of law are needed as practicable guides for advice,
conduct and decision. "1
H.

THE BASES AND RANGE OF FEDERAL MARITIME LAW

While the Constitution does not give the federal courts express
authority to create a body of maritime law, 4- a seasoned body of
maritime principles and rules exists for use by federal and state courts.
The sources of this law are as follows: (1) the historical usages of

39. Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUM. L. REV.

959 (1952). See also RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§6

(1971); Yntema, The Objectives of Private InternationalLaw, 35 CAN. B. REV.
721, 734-35 (1957), 48 REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PRIVE [REV. CRIT. D.I.P.] 1, 19-20 (1959).
40. R. LEFLAR. supra note 30, at 245.
41. See Cheatham, supra note 25, at 18-20.
42. Moore, Federalism and Foreign Relations, 1965 DUKE L.J. 248, 271,
279-80.
43. See cases cited notes 10 & 11 supra; accord, ALI, FEDERAL COURTS,
supra note 15, Commentary at 225-28. See also American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26
U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 544 (1828).
44. Cheatham, supra note 25, at 19.
45. See D. ROBERTSON, ADMIRALTY AND FEDERALISM 2 (1970). But
cf. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
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maritime commerce developed in Western Europe in commercial
courts, as adopted and fragmentized by national courts;" (2) international conventions and treaties for promoting the standardization, unification and codification of commercial maritime law;4 7 and
(3) congressional legislation regulating the transportation of goods
and passengers by water. 4" In addition, customs and usages of
comparative, or foreign, maritime law may be employed by an
American court sitting in admiralty within the common law system. 4 9
A. The Congressional Grant of Maritime Competence
Section 1333 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides, in
part: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction... of:
(1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to
suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise
entitled. (2) [Prize Cases] ." This congressional grant of maritime
competence, implementing article III, section 2, clause 1 of the
Constitution,5
is completely dependent for meaning on the considerable body of case law that has been developed on the subject. s1
The American Law Institute rejected a proposal that it draft a model
statute defining the competence of the courts by an enumeration of
specific classes of cases, similar to the English Administration of
Justice Act of 1956. 2 The Institute, while realizing the inherent
limitations and illogical methodology of the present legislation,5 3
reaffirmed both the substance of the maritime enabling statute and
46. Yiannopoulos, The Unification of PrivateMaritime Law by International
Conventions, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 370, 370-71 (1965). See Derrett,
Comment, 10 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 637, 638 (1961).
47. See Mendelsohn, The Public Interest and Private InternationalMaritime
Law, 10 WM. & MARY L. REv. 783 (1969); Chauveau, Conventionsfor Uniform
Laws, 83 J. Du DRoIT INTERNATIONAL 571 (1956); Felde, GeneralAverage
and the York-Antwerp Rules, 27 TUL. L. REv. 406 (1953).
48. Compare Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970) with
The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959) and Braen v. Pfeifer Oil Transport
Co., 361 U.S. 129 (1959). See also Wetherington, JurisdictionalBases of Maritime
Claims Founded on Acts of Congress, 18 U. MIAMI L. REV. 163 (1963);
Deutsch, Development of the Theory of Admiralty Jurisdiction in the United
States, 35 TUL. L. REv. 117 (1960); Currie, The Silver Oar and All That: A
Study of the Romero Case, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1959).
49. See, e.g., In re Sincere Navigation Corp., 329 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. La.
1971).
50. See note 17 supra.
51. ALI, FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 15, at 229-30.
52. 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 46.
53. ALI, FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 15, at 230.
Vol. 6-No. 1
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the notion that admiralty and maritime cases are not necessarily
"wet": "The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction extends to and
includes all claims arising out of any maritime transaction or
occurrance irrespective of where the claim arose or the damage or
injury occurred." 4
The Administration of Justice Act of 1956 vests the English High
Court of Admiralty with competence over nineteen specified classes of
cases in addition to any other competence previously vested. Section
one provides that the Court may hear claims:
(a) to the possession or ownership of a ship...;
(b) between the co-owners of a ship as to possession, employment
or earnings of that ship;
(c) in respect of a mortgage of or charge on a ship...;
(d) for damage done by a ship;
(e) for damage received by a ship;
(f) for loss of life and personal injury in consequence of any
defect in a ship or in her apparel or equipment, or of the
wrongful act... of the owners, charterers or persons in possession or control of a ship are responsible,... in the navigation
or management of the ship, in the loading, carriage or
discharge of goods ... or... persons from the ship;
(g) for loss of or damage to goods carried in a ship;
(h) [regarding] the carriage of goods in... or... the use or hire
of a ship; s5
56
(j) [sic] in the nature of salvage;
(k) in the nature of towage;
(1) in the nature of pilotage;
(m) in respect of goods or materials supplied to a ship for her
operation or maintenance;
(n) in respect of the construction, repair or equipment of a
ship... ;
(o) by a master or member of the crew of a ship for wages...;
(p) in respect of disbursements made on account of a ship;
(q) [of] general average...;
(r) arising out of bottomry;
(s) [arising in respect to the libel in rem of a ship or cargo] for
droits of Admiralty."1
54. Id. (emphasis added).
55. Section 1-(1)(h) applies to any cause of action whether characterized as
contract or tort. Schwartz & Co., Ltd. v. The St. Elefterio, [1957] 1 L.L.R. 283,
286 (Admiralty Div.).
56. Sections 1-(1)(j)-l) also apply to aircraft.
57. See also ALI, FEDERAL COURTS,supra note 15, Appendix at 502-03; 1
STEVENS BRITISH SHIPPING LAW § 23 (1964) (emphasis added) [hereinafter

cited as STEVENS].
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Additionally, section 504 of the English Merchant Shipping Act of
1 8 9 4 s8 provides exclusive competence in the High Court of Admiralty for collision, limitation of liability cases, and hypothecation of
a vessel. Finally, the 1956 Act defines a ship as "any description of
vessel used in navigation." 9
Comparison of the respective American and British legislative
methods of vesting their judiciaries with competence over maritime
cases demonstrates three significant distinguishing features. First, the
Administration of Justice Act is a legislative grant of power while
28 U.S.C. § 1333 is a legislative implementation of a constitutional grant of power. 60 Practically, both courts are faced with a
legislative interpretation problem; 6 ' however, the constitutional
underpinnings of the United States congressional grant enable United
States courts to act as the final arbiters of their own power, since they
are the final arbiters of questions arising under the Constitution. 2
Secondly, the different legislative approaches to defining maritime
competence reinforce the conclusion that the United States courts are
the final arbiters of their own adjudicative power because United
States courts are implicitly relied upon to define and delimit the range
of their own competence. 63 In effect, Congress has said that those
cases are maritime that the courts say are maritime. 4 Finally, while
the British enabling statute implicitly refers to municipal decisional or
statutory law," the American statute, by paralleling the wording and
intent of the original constitutional grant, indicates that the grant may
have been made in reference to a body of transnational law6 6 that
transcends the specific statutory or decisional rules codified or
adopted by United States lawmakers. 67

58. 57 & 58 Vict., c. 60.
59. 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 46, § 8(1).
60. Compare Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354
(1959) and Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202 (1971) with Schwartz &
Co., Ltd. v. The St. Elefterio, [1957] 1 L.L.R. 283 (1957).
61. Cf. 1 STEVENS, supra note 57, at 23.
62. See generally The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12
How.) 443 (1851).
63. Compare Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917) with
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920) and Washington v. W. C.
Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924).
64. Accord ALI, FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 15, at 229-30.
65. See generally 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 46, § § 1(1), 5(2).
66. Cf. Queens Ins. Co. v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 263 U.S. 487, 493
(1924).
67. See, e.g., D. ROBERTSON, supra note 45, at 2-3.
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The jurisprudential problem of whether there can be a rule of
international law developed in national forums independent of
national or municipal law is beyond the scope of this note. 68 The
more practical problem of defining the sources of rules of maritime
law developed by our national legislature and courts, however, is
essential and necessitates a determination of the reasons for initiating
and preserving a distinctive body of national maritime law. 69
Hamilton, commenting on the original constitutional grant of
maritime competence, concluded:
The most bigoted idolizers of State authority have not thus far shown a
disposition to deny the national judiciary the cognizances of maritime cases.
They so generally depend on the laws of nations, and so commonly affect
the rights of foreigners, that they fall within the considerations which are
relative to public peace ....70
Two aspects of this statement indicate the jurisprudential significance
of the constitutional grant of maritime competence to the federal
judiciary. First, the cases arising under this grant were to be decided
by the laws of nations. The ancient laws of Oleron, Wisbuy and the
Hanseatic League, as well as the Marine Ordinances of Louis XIV, 1
constituted the basic source material for the Colonial and ViceAdmiralty courts during the late 18th century. 72 Furthermore,
commentators of the period considered the law of the sea and the law
of nations, as Grotius popularized the term, jurisprudentially
related13 and dependent on the size and significance of a military and

68. See generally Etat Franqais c. Comit6 de la Bourse d'Amsterdam (affaire
de l'emprunt des Messageries Maritimes), [1951] D. Jur. 749 (Cass. Civ. Ire);
P. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1956).

69. A relevant question today is to what extent the old General Admiralty
Rules, 5 Stat. 516 (1842), were an aid in keeping maritime law pure and
distinctive. See Crutcher, supra note 15, at 375-76.
70. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 491 (H. Lodge ed. 1908) (A. Hamilton)
(emphasis added).
71. See 30 F. Cas. 1174-1216. De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418 (No. 3,776)
(C.C.D. Mass. 1815).
72. See, e.g., 4 E. BENEDICT, THE LAW OF AMERICAN ADMIRALTY
439-41 (6th ed. 1940); Currie, supra note 48, at 2-4. "The laws of Oleron, as they
were called, might constitute a national code of maritime law, for the direction of
the admiral, and whatever was defective therein was supplied from that great
fountain of jurisprudence, the civil law... :' 3 J. REEVES, HISTORY OF THE
ENGLISH LAW 198 (1787, 2d ed. reprint 1969); accord 2 A. BROWNE, A
COMPENDIOUS

VIEW

OF THE CIVIL

LAW AND

OF THE LAW

OF THE

39 (1802).
73. 2 A. BROWNE, supra note 72, at 43.

ADMIRALTY
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merchant marine. 17 Likewise, the principle of freedom of the seas had
found wider currency in the late 18th and early 19th century as an
essential element of international law: "Le principe de la libertg de la
haute mer.... demure ga base essentielle de tout le droit international
public maritime." 7" Perhaps, as a necessary corollary to the territorial
principle that no nation owned the sea and, therefore, no nation
governed the sea, there developed the principle that national vessels
were floating portions of the nation and therefore subject to the law
of the nations and of the sea. 7 During the period of the Articles of
Confederation, however, the founding fathers envisioned the jurisprudential solution of the problem; the state courts were to adjudicate
maritime cases according to "the maritime law and the law of nations,
and the ordinances of... Congress... and the laws of this state;" 77
"the Laws of Oleron or the Sea Laws;" 78 the "laws of Oleron, the
Rhodian and Imperial laws... ;,,779 and "the maritime law and the law
of nations . .8.0." At the time of the constitutional grant "maritime
law" was conceptualized as a body of public and private transnational
principles and rules governing commerce on the high seas. 81 The
second aspect of Hamilton's statement that indicates the jurisprudential significance of the constitutional grant of maritime competence to the federal judiciary is its reference to the public nature of
maritime causes, which "commonly affect the rights of foreigners... relative to the public peace"--indicating that the grant of
competence in the federal courts was a means of legalizing international disputes. Therefore, the federal courts sitting in admiralty
were intended to perform a quasi-regulatory function in the foreign
affairs area. 2 Interestingly, the removal of maritime competence in
74. Id. at 23.
75.

Y.

BLUM, HISTORIC TITLES IN

INTERNATIONAL

LAW

242 (1965)

G. GIDEL, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC DE LA MER; LE
TEMPS DE PAIx 632 (1934).
76. Cf. C. COLOMBos, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 285-88
(1967).
77. Laws of New Jersey (1781), 4 E. BENEDICT, supra note 72, at 439.
78. Laws of the General Assembly of Rhode Island, 4 E. BENEDICT, supra
note 72, at 441.
79. Laws of Virginia, c. 26 (1779) cited in Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.)
474 (1847); see 4 E. BENEDICT, supra note 72, at 440.
80. Laws of Pennsylvania (1778), 4 E. BENEDICT, supra note 72, at 439. See
generally D. ROBERTSON, supra note 45, at 95-103.
81. Accord Queens Ins. Co. v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 263 U.S. 487,
493 (1924); cf. D. ROBERTSON, supra note 45, at 16, 103.
82. See note 70 supra and accompanying text. See also Moore, supra note 42,
at 260.
citing 3
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England from the port courts around the middle of the 14th century
and the subsequent grant to the admirals' courts as branches of the
royal prerogative were occasioned by foreign relations considerations. " Complaints of piracy and numerous spoils claims made by or
against foreign sovereigns occasioned the initial establishment of an
admirals' court with more than local competence. 84
At the time of the initial legislative grant of power to the federal
courts over maritime cases, the function of the court was to adjudicate
private disputes that contained a marked propensity to embroil
nations in public international conflicts. The court adjudicated such
claims by reference to a transnational body of principles and rules
regarding commerce on the high seas and navigable waterways that
was independent of and a source for municipal decisional and
statutory law.8 5 Ironically, the Judiciary Act of 1789 accomplished
through the inclusion of the saving to suitors clause what even "the
most bigoted idolizers of State authority" could not: the concurrent
grant of maritime cognizance to state courts. 6
B. The Historical Usages of Maritime Commerce
The substantive rules of law, developed over a number of centuries
and used as sources and evidence of the general maritime law, s' cover
a multitude of activities relating to persons engaged in the fransportation of goods and persons by water. The Laws of Oleron, or Les Us et
Coutumes de la Mer, 88 is the foremost compilation of these rules.
Generally, the scope of these substantive rules is the regulation of the
relationships between the shipowners (or their agents) and either

83. See 4 E. BENEDICT, supra note 72, at 360.
84. Id.
85. In addition to the merchant or commercial cases which engendered
foreign relations considerations, the grant of competence of Prize Cases presented
the courts with a unique international function in time of war. See, e.g., Glass v.
The Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1 (1794); Penhallow v. Doane, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
54 (1795). Prize law and prize jurisdiction may continue to be of some
significance in modem naval warfare. For example, in October of 1950 the Office of
the Judge Advocate General, Department of the Navy, published a manual of
Instructions for Prize Masters and Special Prize Commissioners (Navexos P-285).
See also Act of August 10, 1956, c. 1041, 70A Stat. 474, 10 U.S.C. § § 7651-81
(1970).
86. See ALI, FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 15, at 229-34.
87. 30 F. Cas. at 1203 (referring to the Marine Ordinances of Louis XIV).
88. 30 F. Cas. at 1171.
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employees of the shipowner or shippers of cargo. For example, article
1 regulates the powers of the master to sell the ship or its tackle, and
article 2 gives the owner the power to control the times of departure.
Articles 3 and 5 deal with the duties of seamen concerning the vessel
and cargo:
Mariners are obligated to look carefully after everything that relates to the
preservation of the ship and goods. The obligation of the mariner to the
master, begins as soon as he is hired... and ends when the voyage is
finished, and they are returned. The obligation to the merchant is from the
beginning of his charge, and the mariner is obligated to stow and unstow the
goods ... [and] keep them from damnifying .... 89
Articles 6 and 7 obligate the owners to provide the seamen with
maintenance and cure for injuries and sickness while "in the service of
the ship." Articles 8 and 9 relate to general average of the ship to the
cargo and vice versa. Article 10 deals with the master's duty to furnish
seaworthy tackle and to make it available for inspection by the
shippers. Article 11 imposes upon the shipowner the duty of
seamanship, which is the duty of safe carriage at sea for the benefit of
the shippers. Article 14 provides rules for mutual fault collisions, and
articles 15 and 22 through 26 regulate pilotage. Finally, articles 23, 30
and 31 refer to the salvaging of property at sea and ashore.
The Laws of Wisbuy, or the Visby Sji6riit, had a marked influence
on the development of the English maritime law, the Scandinavian
maritime codes 90 and the laws of the Hanse towns. 91 The substantive
rules are more complex than those of Oleron. They deal with
master-crew relationships, the maritime duties of the crew to the ship,
cargo and freight, 92 general average, contracts to repair ships,
maintenance and cure, the duty of care in the loading and unloading
of cargo by means of the ship's tackle, 93 navigation, pilotage, salvage,
the ship's discipline, deviation and the duty of transshipment, specific
average, and collisions. As in the Laws of Oleron, the conceptual focal
point is the carrier-shipper relationship.
The Laws of the Hanse Diets, 94 first enacted in 1597 at Lubeck
as a maritime law merchant, were substantively based on the Visby

89. 30 F. Cas. at 1173.
90. Pineus, Sources of Maritime Law Seen from a Swedish Point of View, 30
TUL. L. REv. 85, 87-89 (1955).
91. 30 F. Cas. at 1197.
92. These articles are comparable to the Laws of Oleron. See 30 F. Cas. at
1189-97.
93. Visby S]iriiit,art. 22.
94. 30 F. Cas. at 1197.
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Sj6ralt and Laws of Oleron.95 In addition, the laws governed the
contract for the construction of a vessel. For example,
[n]o master shall undertake to build a ship, unless he is assured that his
owners... are agreed upon what model it shall be built...;
which... owners shall be burghers and inhabitants of any one of the Hanse
towns. 96
Articles 3, 4 and 5 related to the repairing and provisioning of a vessel.
The Hanse laws also governed bottomry bonds, ship's mortgages and
pledges, and affreightments. In addition to providing for maintenance
and cure, article 19 provided that masters were obligated to give
mariners certificates of their faithful service. Finally, article 30
provided a more complex method of ship's discipline than reliance on
the master for summary justice in more serious matters: "If one
mariner kills another the master is bound to seize him, and keep him
in safe custody till he arrives at his port, and then to deliver him up to
the justice to be punished."
The Hanse laws reflect both the complexity of financing,
operating and manning a 16th century merchant vessel and the
relative complexity of the 16th century North Sea merchant marine
industry. The central focus around which the legal system was built
was the carrier-shipper, vessel-cargo relationship. Furthermore, the
enactment of laws reflected a public concern over private maritime
affairs, although the most notable provision was a monopolistic
restraint of trade. 11 In addition, the issuance of certificates of faithful
service indicated a public consciousness that good seamen should be
readily identifiable for the benefit of the seamen themselves, ship and
cargo owners, and the maritime economy of the league.
The last compilation of maritime usages and customs that served
as a source of the law of the sea and of nations for the early admiralty
courts of the United States was the Marine Ordinances of Louis XIV,
1681.8 The Ordinances were influenced by the prior Visby SjariIlt
and Laws of the Hanse Diets."
Subsequently, in 1807, the
Ordennance de la Marine was codified in the Code Napol6on, and it
remains a substantial element of the present French maritime law.10 0
Substantively, the rules of law expounded in the Ordennance are as
commercially feasible and fair as are those codified in France or
95. Pineus, supra note 90, at 87; 30 F. Cas. at 1197.
96. Laws of the Hanse Diets, art. 2.
97. Id.

98. 30 F. Cas. at 1203.
99. 30 F. Cas. at 1203; Pineus, supra note 90, at 88.
100. Pineus, supra note 90, at 88.
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available in the United States today, and the methodology of its
construction-its bilateral focus, first, on persons and interpersonal
relationships and obligations and, secondly, on the subject matter of
the relationships-illuminates the range of activity characterized as
maritime. 1 ' First, the primary focus of the Code is on those persons
who move goods (cargo) by means of ships on water for a
living-masters, seamen and owners-and their relationships among
themselves and with the state. Secondly, the rules focus on the nature
of the relationship between the carrier and the owner of the goods to
be carried-the shipper-as the primary personal relationship to be
regulated. Finally, the substantive rules regulate the carrier-shipper
101. The commercial nucleus of L'Ordennance is found in two sections
entitled "Mariners and Ships" and "Maritime Contracts"; each of these sections is
further subdivided into titles and articles. "Mariners and Ships" deals first with
the qualifications, duties, rights and authority of masters. For example, title 1,
article 9 provides that the master "shall be answerable for all the goods laded
aboard his ship, which he shall be obligated to deliver according to the laws of
lading." Secondly, titles 2 and 3 deal with the duties, rights and obligations of the
mate and seamen (un homme de mer). Thirdly, title 4 concerns the owners of
ships; article 1 provides that anyone "may cause ships to be built or bought, fit
them out themselves, freight [or charter] them to others, and drive a trade at
sea," Finally, title 5-"of ships and vessels"-deals with maritime liens and the
hypothecation of a vessel, as well as registry with the "officers of the admiralty"
and "secretary of state, who has the management of the maritime affairs ....
"
While the focus of the first section is on persons and interpersonal relationships
and obligations, the focus of "Maritime Contracts" is the regulation of the subject
matter of these relationships by means of characterization. For example, title 1 is
"of charter Parties and Freighting of Ships"; title 2 is "of Bills of Lading"; title 3
is "of Freight" and covers general average, the duty of safe and speedy carriage
with deviation, and defenses for failure to fulfill this duty, e.g., restraint of prices.
Further, article 23 gives the master a preferred lien on "goods of his lading; as
long as they are in the ship, in lighters, or upon the quay [dock]; or wherever the
goods may be, within fifteen days after the delivery... :'Title 4 is "of Contracts

and Wages of Seamen" and title 5 is "of Contracts of Bottomry." Title 5, article 2
provides that "money may be given upon the body and keel of the ship ...rigging
and tackle, munitions and provisions... and... loading, for one whole
voyage.. ."; however, article 4 forbids anyone "to take up any money upon the
freight ... to be made ....the profit expected.

. .

or even upon the seaman's

wages." Title 6, article 1 allows "all our subjects... to insure, and cause to be
insured.., the ship's goods and effects, which shall be transported by sea or by
navigable rivers .... ." Title 6, articles 70-74 provide for arbitration agreements
with an appeal to the courts of parliament. See materials cited notes 24 & 25
supra. Title 7-"of averages"-and title 8-"of Ejections and Constitutions"-deal
with the causes of specific and general average between the carrier and the
shipper.
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relationship from "lading" until "delivery... upon the quay, or
wherever" for fifteen days. As long as the carrier is responsible for the
safety of the goods as a matter of law, the law that imposes and
regulates that duty is the law of water transportation.
C. InternationalConventions and Treaties
The Constitution provides that the treaties of the United States
are the law of the land.10 2 Competence of a cause of action regarding
such a treaty would be federal question competence.' 03 Commentators,' 0 4 members of the admiralty bar 1 0 I and the courts 06 regard
treaties directly and indirectly regulating the transportation of goods
and people by water to be within the maritime competence of the
courts. The International Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading, 0 7 or the Hague Rules, 108
as enacted into United States positive law by the Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act (COGSA),' 9 is the most commercially important body of
rules and principles of international origin in force in the United
States as municipal law.
The major portion of commercial common carriage' 1 0 activity is
governed by COGSA 1 1 1 and, through contractual reference, the

102. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW
41-42 (8th ed. 1955); cf. The Scotia, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170, 188 (1871).
103. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970); accord ALI, FEDERAL COURTS, supra
note 15, at 5.
104. See, e.g., G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 10, at 124-27, 125
n.23.
105. See generally, Mendelsohn, supra note 47, at 783-84.
106. See generally, Robert C. Herd & Co. v. Krawill Machinery Corp., 359
U.S. 297 (1959).
107. See generally, The International Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to Bills of Lading, August 25, 1924, 51 Stat. 233, T.S.
931, L.N.T.S. 155, codified as 46 U.S.C. § § 1300-15 (1970) (COGSA).
108. The International Convention is also known as the 1924 Hague Rules
Convention. See Mendelsohn, supra note 47, at 784 (discussing the 1968 Protocol
to the 1924 Hague Rules Convention).
109. See note 107 supra.
110. The need for predictability, uniformity and certainty in international
private carriage has been secured by the use of standard form charter parties. See,
e.g., THE UNIFORM GENERAL CHARTER, rev. 1922, THE DOCUMENTARY
COUNCIL

OF THE

BALTIC

AND

WHITE SEA CONFERENCE

(GENCON)

(voyage charter), G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 10, at 796-801; IME
CHARTER, N.Y. PRODUCE EXCHANGE. amend. 1946, id. at 802-09.
111. Cf Mendelsohn, supra note 47, at 784; Yiannopoulos, supra note 46, at
371-72. The impact of COGSA or the Hague Rules is clearly evident in the
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York-Antwerp Rules of 1950.1 ' 2 Section 1301(e) of COGSA
provides that the range of substantive coverage ".. . covers the period
of time when the goods are loaded on to the time when they are
discharged from the ship"-from "tackle to tackle." Section 1303(2)
provides that "[t] he carrier shall properly and carefully load, handle,
stow, carry, keep, care for, and discharge the goods carried." '1 3 The
York-Antwerp Rules, which regulate the adjustment of general average
between carrier and shipper, are not statutory but are incorporated by
reference in virtually all contracts of common carriage.' 1 4 They cover
successful sacrifices of the ship or cargo".. at sea or while stranded
ashore, 1 6 including jettison, fire, cutting away," ' voluntary stranding and lightening, as long as the sacrifice was made for the common
safety. The range of coverage is the regulation of the carrier-shipper
relationship regarding the vessel, cargo and freight.I 8
Traditionally the international maritime community has been
interested in three aspects of the carriage of goods by water-navigation, safety and the unification of commercial maritime law. Generally, navigation and safety may be characterized as matters of "public"
international concern, and the unification of commercial" 9 maritime
law may be characterized as a "private" international matter.
Since many nations have previously invested large sums of money in
their own lighthouses and navigation systems, governments tend to be
antagonistic toward uniform navigational aids. 2 ' Nonetheless, con-

Maritime Code of the U.S.S.R. See Dobrin, The Soviet Maritime Code, 16 J.
COMP. LEGIS. & INT'L L. 252, 253 (1934).
112. Yiannopoulos, supra note 46, at 372. The complete text of the rules is
available in 8 STEVENS, supra note 57, at 1105-11.
113. Compare this text with the text of the Marine Ordinances of Louis XIV
(1681) supra at p.
114. See Govare, Les R~gles d'York et d'Anvers 1950, [1950] DROIT
MARITIME FRAXCAIS 3, 4-6 (1950).

115, Rule A, quoted in 8 STEVENS, supra note 57, at 1106.
116. Rules I-IV, quoted in 8 STEVENS, supra note 57, at 1106-07.
117. Rules V, VIII, quoted in 8 STEVENS, supra note 57, at 1107.
118. Rules C, D, quoted in 8 STEVENS, supra note 57, at 1106.
119. See generally 8 STEVENS, supra note 57, at 58-101. See Jambu.Merlin,
R~flexions sur le Droit Social Maritime, [1961] DROIT MARITIME FRANCAIS
131 for an excellent discussion of the International Labour Organization's
Maritime Conventions and Recommendations. For a text of these conventions
see 8 STEVENS, supra note 57, at 877-1032. The Conventions cover the employment, welfare and status of seamen, as well as the safety of longshoremen
who are processing vessels.
120. 8 STEVENS, supra note 57, at 3.
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ventions regarding maritime signals,12 1 manned lightships12 2 and
buoyage 123
have been signed and ratified by many countries.
Concerning ships' safety, the International Convention Respecting
Load Lines, 124 which the United States has signed but not ratified,
125
and the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea,
which the United States has both signed and ratified, are the two basic
conventions regulating the carrier and his vessel operating in international and national waterways.
The Comit6 Maritime International in Antwerp has rendered
invaluable service in promoting maritime law as a body of law of
transnational significance and uniformity.' 2 6 In addition to producing the York-Antwerp Rules and the Hague Rules, the Comitg
initiated the movement for standardization, unification and codification of maritime law at its first convention in 1910 by producing
the draft texts of the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
of Law Respecting Assistance and Salvage at Sea.' 2 ' The Convention
applies to all vessels, whether or not state-owned,' 28 and provides, in
article 1, that:
Assistance and salvage of seagoing vessels in danger, of any things on board,
of freight and passage money, and also services of the same nature rendered
by seagoing vessels to vessels of inland navigation or vice-versa, are subject
to the... provisions [of this convention] ... in whatever waters the
services have been rendered.

121. Agreement Concerning Maritime Signals, Lisbon, Oct. 23, 1930, 125
L.N.T.S. 95.
122. Agreement Concerning Manned Lightships Not on Their Stations,
Lisbon, Oct. 23, 1930, 112 L.N.T.S. 21.
123. Agreement for a Uniform System of Maritime Buoyage and Rules
Annexed Thereto, Geneva, May 13, 1936, quoted in 8 STEVENS, supra note 57
at 13.
124. For the text of this convention see 8 STEVENS, supra note 57, at
58-101. The United States has not ratified this convention.
125. 16 U.S.T. 185, T.I.A.S. No. 5780, 536 U.N.T.S. 27 (effective May 26,
1965).
126. 8 STEVENS, supra note 57, at 1047.
127. 37 Stat. 1658, T.S. 576. See also 8 STEVENS, supra note 57, at
1112-16.
128. See also the International Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Concerning the Immunity of State-Owned Ships, Brussels, April 10, 1926, 8
STEVENS, supra note 57, at 1121. While neither the United States nor the Soviet
Union have ratified this Convention, the United States announced that it would
accept the terms of the Convention for purposes of U.S. public vessels.
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The Comitg also produced the text drafts for the conventions
regarding collisions,' 29 the carriage of passengers, maritime liens and
mortgages, 3 ' limitation
of liability, 131 and the immunity of state32
vessels.'
owned
The methodology of the Comit has been to focus primarily on
the carrier and his relationships with the rest of the world, including
and especially the shipper, other carriers and insurers regarding the
risks and losses of commercial carriage by sea. Further, the conventions themselves generally are the result of the negotiations
between the carriers, shippers and cargo insurers. For example, during
the 1968 Protocol to the Hague Rules negotiations, ".... each of the
competing interests was professional, in the sense that each understood and should have fully appreciated what was at stake. Hence,
they had at least an equal opportunity to exert their own pressures
and influence....
Thus the International Convention Relating
to the Arrest of Seagoing Ships' 34 indicates the range of relationships
governed by international maritime law just as the Administration of
Justice Act' 3 1 indicates the range of relationships conceived to be
governed by national law:
(a) damage caused by any ship either in collision or
otherwise' 36 [carrier v. injured, carrier] ;
129. International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law
with Regard to Collisions Between Vessels, Brussels, Sept. 23, 1910, 8 STEVENS.
supra note 57, at 1067; 10 AM. J. Comp. L. 445 (1961).
130. International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law
Relating to Maritime Liens and Mortgages, Brussels, April 10, 1926, 8 STEVENS,
supra note 57, at 1087. The United States is not a signatory to the Convention;
however, the .Foreign Ship's Mortgage Act of 1954, 46 U.S.C. § 951 (1970)
provides that a foreign mortgage which is valid under the Convention will be
recognized in U.S. courts.
131. International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating
to the Limitation of the Liability of Owners of Seagoing Vessels, Brussels, Aug.
25, 1924, replaced by the Convention of 1957, Brussels, Oct. 10, 1957, 8
STEVENS, supra note 57, at 1058. See Mendelsohn, supra note 47, at 789-91
for an excellent comparison of United States municipal law and the provisions of
the 1957 Convention in light of the Yarmouth Castle disaster.
132. See note 128 supra. See also J. CASTEL, INTERNATIONAL LAW
658-73 (1965).
133. Mendelsohn, supra note 47, at 785.
134. 8 STEVENS, supra note 57, at 1126. The United States has not ratified
the Convention.
135. See text pp. 196-97 supra.
136. The text of the Convention is related to and built upon prior existing
conventions and generally contemplates a unified body of national law based on
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(b) loss of life or personal injury caused by any ship or
occuring in connection with the operation of any ship
[carrier v. world] [emphasis added];
(c) salvage [carrier v. shipper, insurer, salvor];
(d) [contracts for the use of the ship including charter
parties] [carrier v. carrier] ;
(e) [contracts for carriage of goods] [carrier v. shipper,
insurer];
(f) loss of or damage to goods [carrier v. shipper, insurer];
(g) general average [carrier v. shipper, insurer];
(h) bottomry [carrier v. financier, insurer];
(i) towage;
(j) pilotage [carrier v. pilot];
(k) goods or materials wherever supplied to a
ship [carrier v. supplier];
(1) construction, repair or equipment of any ship [carrier v.
builder, financier, insurer] ;13 7
(m) [seamen's wages] [carrier v. crew];
(n) master's disbursements [carrier v. disbursee];
(o) disputes as to the title ... of any ship [carrier v. carrier,
financier] ;
(p) [disputes to ownership, possession, employment or
earnings of any ship] [carrier v. carrier];
(q) the mortgage or hypothecation of any ship [carrier v.
financier, lienholders].
While the carrier is the basic maritime litigant, the subject matter of
the litigation is his relationship with someone else regarding the
operation, construction, financing, repair, supplying or insurance of
the vessel.
D. CongressionalEnactments
In addition to COGSA 1 3 8 and the specific grant of maritime
Congress has enacted legislation that has been
competence, 1 3
traditionally interpreted and litigated in the federal and state courts
sitting in admiralty as part of the general maritime law.1 40 The
constitutional grant of power to enact substantive maritime rules
the conventions in order to achieve a codification of international maritime law.
137. See discussion of American law at pp. 214, 217 infra.
138. 46 U.S.C. § § 1300-15 (1970).
139. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970).
140. See, e.g., The Delaware, 161 U.S. 459 (1896) (interpreting the Harter
Act, 46 U.S.C. § § 190-95 (1970) as a "suit in admiralty").
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emanates from the "admiralty clause"''
rather than the "commerce
clause."' 42 While the distinction between interstate or international
commerce and interstate or international maritime commerce 1 4 3 is
illusory, the courts have made the distinction and have unilaterally
determined what legislation is valid as either a maritime or a
commerce clause exercise of power. For example, in Southern Pacific
Company v. Jensen' 4 4 the Supreme Court held that a state was
without power to extend its workmen's compensation remedy to a
longshoreman injured on the gangplank between the vessel and the
pier since that area was exclusively' 4 within the maritime legislative
jurisdiction of the United States.' 4 6 Therefore, the subsequently
47
enacted Longshoremen and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act'
had to be defined by Congress' 4 8 and by the Court 1 4 9 as a valid
exercise of congressional maritime, rather than commerce clause,
legislative power. "' Notwithstanding the general pronouncement in
Romero'
that maritime competence is not federal question
competence and that by implication maritime legislative jurisdiction is
not commerce clause legislative jurisdiction, a great deal of litigation
developed in the federal courts prior to Nacerima OperatingCompany
v. Johnson,' 2 in which longshoremen unsuccessfully contended that
maritime commerce and commerce clause powers were comple5 3
mentary concepts.'
While the distinction is procedurally relevant for purposes of jury
trials in the United States,' 54 it is not discernible in other legal
systems; furthermore, politico-economic and jurisprudential considerations demonstrate that the maritime-commerce clause dichotomy is
141. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
142. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
143. See, e.g., O'Leary v. Puget Sound Bridge & Dry Dock Co., 349 F.2d 571,
575 (9th Cir. 1965).
144. 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
145. See Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924).
146. 244 U.S. at 216-17.
147. 33 U.S.C. § § 901 et seq. (1970).
148. See S. REP. No. 973, 69th Cong., 1 Sess., at 16.
149. Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212, 217 (1969). See also
Swanson v. Marra Bros., Inc., 328 U.S. 1 (1946).
150. 396 U.S. at 218-19.
151. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 375-77
(1959).
152. 396 U.S. 212 (1969).
153. See, e.g., O'Leary v. Puget Sound Bridge & Dry Dock Co., 349 F.2d 571
(9th Cir. 1965).
154. Cf. 349 F.2d at 575. See also cases cited note 15 supra.
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not practically significant in the United States. Mr. Boyd, speaking on
the Department of Transportation's ranges of activity, stated that
[t] he only major federal promotional activity in the field of transportation
outside of the Department is the Federal Maritime Administration. Initially,
it was proposed that the ... Administration be included in the Department ....
[T]he maritime forces organized successfully to keep the
maritime Administration out. I believe this was an error .... A comprehensive systems approach to transportation simply cannot end abruptly at
the water's edge. Policy developed for domestic and international transportation will necessarily have an impact on this intermediate leg of the journey.
Conversely, the impact of maritime policy will be felt in domestic
transportation. 1 5 5
The truisms implicit in Mr. Boyd's comments belie any rational basis
for an administrative separation of maritime commerce from nonmaritime commerce within the Executive's supervisory and regulatory
functions. However successful the "maritime forces" may have been in
the past, the time probably will come when they will be forced to
unite with nonmaritime interests in order to effect a comprehensive
system of regulation of international commerce and transportation for
the benefit of all United States carriers.
The comparative method of civilian law nations is to treat all
commercial law, including commercial transportation law, as a lex
speciales.'I I The German Commercial Code is demonstrative of the
more general civil law treatment of commercial transactions.' 5 7 The
Code is divided into four books: Book I concerns commercial
regulation in general; Book II is concerned essentially with partnerships, limited partnerships and stock corporations; Book III governs
commercial transactions, specifically including land and rail transportation;'
and Book IV deals with maritime commerce. 15 9 The
Code distinguishes between maritime commerce and non-maritime
commerce on the basis of substantive rules to be applied to the
transaction being regulated-not on the basis of the concept that
commerce as a scope of activity to be regulated is distinct from
maritime commerce. The statutory intent of the Federal Republic was

155. Boyd, The United States Department of Transportation,33 J. AIR L. &
COM. 225, 228 (1967).
156. R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 405,405 n.4 (1970).
157. Cf. id. at 377-78, 383-84.
158. BGB § § 407-460 (Koblhammer 1949).
159. BGB § § 474-905 (Kohlhammer 1949). The code is especially reflective
of the 1924 Hague Rules, by the revisions of 1937 and 1940. R.SCHLESINGER,
supra note 156, at 378.
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to promulgate a single commercial code that regulates all commercial
transactions.
Within the common law sphere the same conceptual frame of
reference concerning the legislative allocation of jurisdiction within a
federal system appears in the British North America Act of 1867
(BNA).' 6 0 Section 92, paragraph 10 gives the Canadian provincial
legislatures exclusive jurisdiction in all works and undertakings except
with respect to "Lines of Steam... ships," interprovince and international commerce.' 61 Section 91, paragraph 29 allocates exclusive
jurisdiction over these matters to the federal legislature,' 62 and
16
includes within its scope the regulation of navigation and shipping, 3
interprovince and international ferries,"'6 navigation aides 1 6 5 and
66
quarantine and marine hospitals. '
In the case of Reference re Validity of the IndustrialRelations &
Disputes Investigation Act' 7 the Supreme Court of Canada held that
the act regulating collective bargaining and unfair labor practices as
applied to disputes between stevedores and their employers under
BNA section 91 was a constitutional regulation of interprovince and
international commerce. Justice Taschereau remarked:
Regulation of employment of stevedores is... an essential part of navigation and shipping and is essentially connected with the carrying on of the
transportation by ship. Even if... the [new] law may affect provincial
rights, it is nevertheless valid [as] it is... in relation
to a subject within the
68
federal legislative power under [BNA] S.91.1
Justice Locke, who dissented on the grounds that the Act should have
been held inapplicable to office workers, noted that the Act was a
valid exercise of constitutional power to regulate international commerce because:
[R]egulation of the relationship between persons engaged in shipping and
those employed by them at sea has... been recognized necessary for the
160. 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3.
161. 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, § 92 (10).
162. 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, § 91 (29); see Montreal v. Montreal Street Ry.,
[1903] A.C. 482.
163. 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, § 91 (10).
164. 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, § 91 (13).
165. 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, § 91 (9).
166. 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, § 91 (11). See generally McNaim, Transportation, Communication and The Constitution; The Scope of Federal Jurisdiction,
47 CAN. B. REv. 355, 356-57 (1969).
167. Reference re Validity of the Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act (R.S.C. 1952, c. 152), [1955] Can. S. Ct. 529.
168. [1955] Can. S. Ct. at 541.
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effective regulation.., of
the operations of ships.... [and] is legislation in
169
relation to shipping ....
While the theory of the dissenting justices seems to indicate that
maritime jurisdiction is unique, the theory of the majority appears to
adopt the view that the regulation of interprovince and international
commerce is a comprehensive jurisdiction that does not recognize the
independence of admiralty. Citing Harris v. Best Ryley & Co. I 7 for
the proposition that loading is the joint act of the carrier and the
shipper, Taschereau concluded that this process was done pursuant to
contracts for international commercial carriage and, therefore, that
the Act was valid as a regulation of international commerce. 7 1
Considering the admiralty clause-commerce clause dichotomy of
congressional legislative jurisdiction as distinct and separate bases of
congressional power to regulate commercial maritime affairs, the
courts have heard cases arising under several statutes on the basis of
maritime competency. The classic congressional enactment is the Fire
Statute or Fire Act;' 1 2 coverage extends to "any merchandise
whatsoever, which shall be shipped, taken in, or put on board any
such vessel." The Limitation of Liability Act,1 7 3 which includes the
Fire Statute, generally applies to "all seagoing vessels, and also to all
vessels used on lakes or rivers or in inland navigation including canal
boats, barges, and lighters."' 7 4 The limitation of liability acts and
revisions extend coverage to "commercial seagoing vessels." '1 7 In
addition to the "tackle to tackle" coverage provided by COGSA' 7 6
for vessels engaged in international carriage, the Harter Act 7 I applies
to all bills of lading covering merchandise transported on "any
vessel.., from or between ports of the United States and foreign
ports." The scope of coverage extends to "liability for loss or damage
caused by [im] proper loading, storage, custody, care or... delivery.'" 7 8
169. [1955] Can. S. Ct. at 573.
170. (1) [1892] 7 Asp. M.C. 272, 274.
171. [1955] Can. S. Ct. at 543.
172. 46 U.S.C. § 182 (1970).
173. 46 U.S.C. § § 181-89 (1970).
174. 46 U.S.C. § 188 (1970).
175. Cf. 46 U.S.C. § 183; see McCaughan, FederalMaritime Jurisdiction over
InlandIntrastateLakes, 26 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 11 (1969).
176. 46 U.S.C. § § 1300-15 (1970).
177. 46 U.S.C. § § 190-96 (1970).
178. Compare COGSA and the Harter Act with The Marine Ordinances of
Louis XIV, Mariners and Ships, title 1, art. 9, Maritime Contracts, title 2, art. 23,
discussed at pp. 202-04 supra,
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In response to Justice Story's opinion in The Steam-Boat Thomas
Jefferson,' 7 9 Congress enacted the Great Lakes Act." '8 The Act
provides for jury trials in the United States courts sitting in
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction relating to any matter of contract or
tort arising upon or concerning any vessel of twenty tons or upward,
enrolled and licensed to the coasting trade, and employed in the business of
commerce and navigation between places in different states upon the lakes
181
and navigable waters connecting said lakes ....
While the Great Lakes Act extended judicial competence to the
navigable waters of the United States, the Admiralty Extension
Act' 82 extended the preexisting legislative' 8 3 and decisional law to
"all cases of damage or injury, to persons or property, caused by a
vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding that such damage or injury
be done or consummated on land."' 8 4
In response to The Harrisburg,'8 5 Congress enacted the Jones
Act' 6 and the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA).' 817 The Jones
Act adopted by reference the provisions of the Federal Employers
Liability Act' 8 as an exercise of its admiralty clause jurisdiction.1 89
The scope of coverage extends to any seaman' 9 0 who is injured or
killed in the course of his employment. DOHSA grants a cause of
action in admiralty for the death of any person, which is caused by
negligence or default on the high seas beyond a marine league from
shore.' 9 1 The district court in Echavarria v. Atlantic & Caribbean
Steam Navigation Company I9 2 considered DOHSA a valid exercise of
Congress' admiralty and commerce clause legislative power.' 93

179. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825).
180. 28 U.S.C. § 1873 (1970).
181. For an interpretation of how the Great Lakes Act did not extend
admiralty jurisdiction, but limited it by providing jury trials see The Propeller
Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851) (Taney, C.J.).
182. 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1970).
183. See Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. at 209.
184. 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1970).
185. 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
186. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970).
187. 46 U.S.C. § § 761-62 (1970).
188. 45 U.S.C. § § 51-60 (1970).
189. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
190. See Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306 (1970); 4 VAND.
INTERNAT'L 148 (1971).
191. 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1970).
192. 10 F. Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1935).
193. 10 F. Supp. at 678.
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Beyond the substantive provisions of COGSA, Congress has been
caught in the Court's intricate and not always logical interpretations
of what is maritime and what is nonmaritime. The best example is the
Ship Mortgage Act of 1920,1 94 which was enacted in response to the
Court's intransigent position that a ship's mortgage is not a maritime
contract.' 9
A contract to build a ship is still held to be a
nonmaritime contract.' 96 In comparison, the Federal Maritime Lien
Act 9 7 was in response to a Supreme Court that would not give a
maritime lien for homeport repairs and supplies when the charter
party disclaimed liability for such a lien.' 9
III.

TOWARD A FUNCTIONAL CHOICE OF LAW RULE

United States courts have failed to articulate precisely a choice of
law rule for distinguishing maritime competence from state common
law, federal diversity, and federal question competence over causes of
action that arise in connection with the transportation of persons and
goods by water. Rather, the courts have been preoccupied with three
classic characterizations-maritime tort, navigable water and vesselthat have assumed a significance independent of the purposes for
which these concepts were articulated originally.
In the first characterization-that of the maritime tort-the maritime competence of the federal courts is predicated on the locality of
the accident: "Maritime torts are those committed on the high seas, or
on waters within the ebb and flow of the tide."' 9 9 When this rule was
first announced by Mr. Justice Story, it had been accepted in no
system of maritime law other than in England.2"'
Unfortunately,
however, succeeding courts accepted Story's scholarship with little
hesitation and, finally, the Court considered the rule to be settled. 20 1
The use of the locality choice of law rule early presented the Court
with the conduct-injury dichotomy-the controlling law is either that

194. 46 U.S.C. § § 911 et seq. (1970).
195. See, e.g., Detroit Trust Co. v. The Thomas Barlum, 293 U.S. 21 (1934).
196. Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424, 438 (1901).
197. 46 U.S.C. § § 971 et seq. (1970).
198. See, e.g., The General Smith, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 438 (1819); cf. The
Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 581-82 (1874).
199. Thomas v. Lane, 23 F. Cas. 957, 960 (No. 13, 902) (C.C. Me. 1813).
200. Compare 404 U.S. at 205-07 with Administration of Justice Act of
1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 46, § 1 (d)-(f), The Marine Ordinances of Louis XIV,
discussed at pp. 202-04 supra, and The International Convention Relating to the
Arrest of Seagoing Ships, discussed at pp. 207-08, supra.
201. 404 U.S. at 206.
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of the place of injury or that of the place of the conduct giving rise to
the injury.2" 2 Absurd results obtaining from the application of the
law of the place of the injury and a suggestion from Congress2 0 3 led
the Court to conclude that the law of the place of the injurious
conduct-regardless of the place of injury-would better serve the
20 4
needs of maritime commerce.
A number of reasons other than Story's reputation as an admiralty
scholar explain the continued vitality of the locality test. The locality
test had become by 1802 so firmly entrenched in English and
American jurisprudence that Professor Browne could state:
We may therefore hold it as ruled, that civil or private injuries to the person,
committed on the seas, are remediable in this court [admiralty]; but here,
and in all matters of tort, locality is the strict limit. There can be no variety
in the subject matter of torts. They cannot, like contracts, relate some to
terrene, some
to marine affairs.... In torts, locality ascertains the judicial
20 s
power.
English jurists, however, are somewhat less culpable than their
American counterparts for this state of affairs. Instructive on this
point is the fact that the Statute of 1389206 on its face was clearly
the result of political-rather than legal-considerations. In comparison, the Marine Ordinances of Louis XIV refer to locality only
insofar as the subject matter of the Ordinances is commercial carriage
of goods by water; moreover, neither the Laws of Oleron, the Visby

202. Cf. Cavers, Legislative Choice of Law: Some European Examples, 44 S.
CAL. L. REV. 341, 352 (1970).

203. 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1970). The House Report on the Extension of
Admiralty Jurisdiction Act stated that the Act was being passed to remedy the
"inequities" of such cases as Martin v. West, 222 U.S. 191 (1911), The Troy, 208
U.S. 321 (1908), and Cleveland Terminal & Valley R.R. v. Cleveland S.S. Co., 208
U.S. 316 (1908), which had held there was no admiralty jurisdiction to provide a
remedy for damage done by ships on navigable waters to land structures. H.R.
REP. No. 1523, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948), at 2. Congress also passed the Jones
Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970), providing a statutory remedy for members of a
ship's crew injured in the course of their employment. The Act covered crewmen
injured ashore as well as aboard and was considered by the Supreme Court to be
an extension of the ancient remedy of maintenance and cure, which itself was a
traditional and important exception to the usual rule that maritime law does not
provide remedies for injuries on land. See O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge &
Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36 (1943). Longshoremen, of course, are not covered by the
Jones Act.
204. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963).
205. 2 A. BROWNE, supra note 72, at 110 (emphasis in original).
206. See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
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Sjbrlt, nor the Laws of the Hanse Diets measures the range of activity
that is governed by locality. Furthermore, the Administration of
Justice Act of 1956 does not limit the competence of the English High
Court of Admiralty to the locality of the event but rather defines its
competence by reference to the causative factor.2 "'
The second characterization with which United States courts have
been preoccupied is that of "navigable waters." This characterization,
however, was derived initially from the more fundamental notion that
the seas are free from any one nation's control.20I The principle that
a nation's territorial sovereignty ends at the water's edge tended to
create a correlative concept of "sea" as a separate legal entity-also
delimited by the water's edge and with a legal significance independent of terrestial matters. 2" 9 The classification of "navigable waters
within the ebb and flow of the tide," therefore, had great practical
significance in the 14th century because of the foreign relations
function of admiralty law. However, the notion of the seas'
sovereignty is embedded firmly in modern public international law2 1 0
and no longer justifies the existence of such a rigid and arbitrary
division in the courts between maritime and nonmaritime matters that
the use of the classification "navigable waters" creates. Moreover, it is
difficult to envisage a physical injury to a person or property caused
by an instrumentality on the "navigable waters" that is not a vessel, its
gear or a member of its crew or passenger list. By defining competence
by reference to locality, therefore, the Court is to a large measure
presently defining competence according to subject matter.
The final characterization with which United States courts have
been preoccupied is that of the "vessel." The word "vessel" is not
merely a symbol that corresponds to the objective reality of a ship; it
has many facets of legal significance. A vessel is an object over which a
nation exercises its sovereignty for purposes of personal, legislative
and subject matter jurisdiction over the persons and property on
board, and for purposes of international relations if the vessel is flying
its flag.2 1 ' A vessel also is an object upon which maritime liens are
given because the debt was incurred for its maintenance.2 1 2 In
addition, a vessel is a vehicle for transporting persons and goods by

207. 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 46, § 1 (f), at 248.
208. Y. BLUM, supra note 75, at 242.
209. C. COLOMBOS, supra note 76, at 285.
210. Y. BLUM, supra note 75, at 242.
211. C. C6LOMnOSsupranote 76, at 285-86.

212. 46 U.S.C. § 971 (1970).
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water for profit, an activity regulated by a special body of
law-maritime law.2 13 While the preceding legal implications seem
simple and obvious, "vessels" also have acquired a conceptual
existence of their own, i.e. one without an external characterization.
For example, in Tucker v. Alexandroff,2 1 4 the Court concluded that
a contract to build a ship is not governed by maritime law because a
"ship is born when she is launched, and lives so long as her identity is
preserved."12 15 While the Court in Thames Towboat Co. v, The
Schooner Francis McDonald2 1 6 modified the excess of the prior
decision by concluding that "contracts to construct entirely new ships
are nonmaritime because [they are] not nearly enough related to any
rights and duties pertaining to commerce and navigation," 2 1
the
Court still concerned itself with the rights and duties pertaining to
transportation of persons or goods by water for profit by means of an
object called a "vessel." In effect, the Court repeated its thought in
Tucker: a contract does not concern the transportation by water of
persons or goods for profit until there exists a vessel, and a vessel does
not exist until it is launched, because prior to that time it cannot
navigate or make a profit.
These are the characterizations with which United States courts
have been concerned; but with what, functionally, is maritime law
concerned? The bases of present law and the range of activity that its
substantive rules and principles govern indicate that the focus of
concern and locus of activity is the person who controls the vessel
used to move persons and cargo 218 by water from one place to
another. This person is called the shipowner, the charterer, or the
carrier. The person who controls, or places into the control of the
carrier, the cargo is called the shipper. The entire body of principles
and rules of water transportation law, including federal maritime law,
is built upon these two individuals and the needs of their relationship.
The carrier-shipper relationship is formed without reference to
water, except to the extent that water identifies the physical element
to be traversed. The relationship is formed without reference to a
vessel, except to the extent that vessel identifies the physical means of
traversing the water. The relationship is similarly formed without

213. Black, supra note 16, at 274.
214. 183 U.S. 424 (1902).
215. 183 U.S. at 438 (emphasis added).
216. 254 U.S. 242 (1920).
217. 254 U.S. at 244.
218. Cargo includes the concept of people, in which case the thing that is
controlled may be identical with the person controlling it.
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reference to navigability, except to the extent that navigability
identifies the physical location of the vessel in relation to the water.
The only other legal significance of these terms is their use in choice
of law-either the choice between maritime law and nonmaritime law
or the choice between one rule of maritime law and another.
The substantive rules of maritime law, however, were developed to
satisfy the needs of the carrier-shipper relationship and focus on the
carrier as the locus of activity. The rule of law, therefore, should be
that the complaint is cognizable in admiralty if the alleged cause of
action is based on a relationship that is as follows:
(1) between two or more parties, one of whom is a carrier; and,
(2) that creates a consensual or legal obligation, the object of
which is activity to regulate either the profits produced by
the use of the vessel or the losses to which the use of the

vessel is subject.
The terms "carrier" and "vessel" are used above in their descriptive
context. A consensual obligation is a contractual obligation; a legal
obligation is an obligation imposed by the rules of federal maritime
law including rules of other bodies of law selected by the maritime
choice of law rule. The object of the obligation can be either
affirmative-an obligation to act-or negative--an obligation to refrain
from acting. "Regulate" connotes control or planning.2 1 9 "Profit"
connotes the commercial nature of the obligation as well as pecuniary
gain itself; "loss" includes the hazards and risks.
More simply, if a carrier is not a plaintiff, a cross-claimant or a
defendant, admiralty competence is not established. Moreover, while
it is not to say that a 12(b)(6) motion is the equivalent of a 12(b)(1)
motion,2 2
the alleged facts must indicate a substantial probability of
recovery either against or by the carrier. In Victory Carriers,Inc. v.

219. The means of articulating the rule is taken from the French Civil Codes.
See 2 M. PLANIOL, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL §§ 156-59,
863B, 947 (12th ed. 1939). The object of an obligation is that which is to be done
or not done in response to the obligation. Id. § 156. The obligation is,
analytically, a "juridical" relationship between two persons, one of whom is
entitled to something and the other is required to furnish that thing. Id. § 157.
The cross obligations are the basis of a synallagmatic contract, similar, as a
concept, to a common law bilateral contract. Id. § 948. See C. Civ. art. 1102-03
(64e Petits Codes Dalloz 1965); HGB art. 273, para. 1, § § 320, 322 (C. H.
Beck) (ErfullungZug urn Zug-execution each for each).
220. FED. R. Civ. P. rule 12(b)(1)-a motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction; rule 12(b)(6)-a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.
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for example, admiralty jurisdiction was held not to exist

under the facts alleged because the carrier was not responsible either
contractually or legally for the maintenance or control of the forklift
that injured the plaintiff longshoreman; 2 2 2 nor was the carrier
responsible for the condition of the pier. He was responsible for the
condition of the ship; if the injury had occurred there, he would have
been liable and the cause
of action, therefore, would have been
22 3
governed by maritime law.

The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
(LHWCA), 22 4 however, is within the maritime competence of the
federal courts since it does not place the carrier in conflict with
someone else; a cause of action under LHWCA is between the
stevedore-employer (a noncarrier) 2 2 I and the employee longshoreman
or harbor worker. The enactment of LHWCA was a direct result of the
Court's decision in Jensen, which held that a state workmen's
compensation act was inapplicable to a longshoreman injured on the
gangplank because the injury took place over the navigable waters of
the United States and stevedoring is a maritime profession.2 2 6
Congress and the courts were restrained by a judge22 7 who had used
the locality choice of law rule22 8 to strike down enlightened state
laws. In the process, the "Jensen line",129 was created, which is
marked by the gangplank. In an attempt to make some sense of this
morass of confusion, Mr. Justice White in Nacirema OperatingCo. v.
Johnson231 concluded that the injuries of three longshoremen, one of
whom was killed, loading a vessel were not compensable under

221. 404 U.S. 202 (1972).
222. 404 U.S. at 213-14.
223. See, e.g., Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52 (1913);
accord, Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946); cf. Halcyon Lines v.

Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952). A recent
congressional modification in the law governing injuries to longshoremen would
change this result if the same factual circumstance occurred today. See note 232
infra.

224. 33 U.S.C. § § 901 et seq. (1970).
225. The Court held that although the charterer of the vessel and the
employer of the stevedore were one and the same, the stevedore could still recover
for damages on the basis of seaworthiness, notwithstanding LHWCA to the
contrary. See Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410, 415 (1963).
226. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
227. Mr. Justice McReynolds. See note 245 infra.
228. See Currie, supra note 7, at 161.
229. Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. at 208 n.7.
230. 396 U.S. 212 (1969).
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LHWCA because the injuries took place on the pier, although a vessel's
cargo hoist was a causal instrumentality.2 3 ' Since the decision in
Jensen, in which the law of the place of the tort rule was used without
reference to the carrier, the subsequent tendency in LHWCA actions
has been for courts to validate state law whenever possible-to correct
the initial error and mitigate the harsh results of Jensen.2 3 2
Other relationships, however, are easily categorized as maritime or
nonmaritime by reference to the needs of the carrier-shipper relationship. A contract to employ a seaman is maritime because it relates
to the carrier's operation of the vessel. A contract to procure marine
insurance is nonmaritime because it purports to regulate the agency
relationship between a carrier and an insurer, and not the risk that the
a
ship will not have marine insurance coverage.2 3 3 The chartering of
2 34
vessel is maritime, but the contract to make a charter party is not.

The contract to sell a ship should be a maritime contract and has been
held to be such in Flota Maritima Browning v. The Ciudad de la
Habana.2 35 A contract to build a ship, while not currently recognized

as within the admiralty competence, should be a contract cognizable
in admiralty and adjudicated according to the federal maritime law,
including maritime choice of law rules. 2 36 The distinction between a

contract to repair 23 7 and a contract to build a ship for purposes of
the competence of a court to hear a case is jurisprudentially unsound.
While the terms of the former have always been adjudicated by the
substantive rules of federal maritime law, the terms of the latter have
been adjudicated by state law. Both contracts, however, create an
obligation designed to control the hazards of employing a vessel that is
structurally unsound without regard for the cause of the structural
defect-faulty construction or faulty repairs. The decisions holding
that contracts to build ships to be registered in coastal or international

231. 396 U.S. at 213-14.
232. Problems concerning the law applicable to longshoremen's and harbor

workers' injuries and deaths-irrespective of the location of the injuries on the pier
or on the ship--no longer arise in the courts. Unless the shipowner was negligent,
the exclusive remedy of the injured longshoreman or harbor worker (either on the
pier or on the deck) is against his employer under LHWCA. For further discussion
of the recent amendment to the LHWCA see 6 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
257 (1972).
233. Cf. Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1 (1870).
234. See 1 E. BENEDICT, supra note 72, at 133-42.

235. 181 F. Supp. 301 (D. Md. 1960).
236. See text at p. 217 supra.
237. See North Pacific S.S. Co. v. Hall Bros. Marine R.R. & Shipbuilding Co.,
249 U.S. 119 (1919).
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trade are not governed by maritime law2 38 perhaps are based on, or
influenced by, two related and unspoken premises: first, since the
contracts are written within a state and to be performed substantially
within a state, state law should govern the terms and performance of
the contract; 2 3 9 secondly, the common law of contracts is sufficiently uniform to assure uniform results in application. 24" By holding
that the contract to build a ship was to be governed by state law, the
Court was avoiding a renvoi situation; the same result could have been
reached by holding that the contract was governed by maritime law,
including maritime choice of law, which, through considerations of
significant contacts and de facto uniformity, would indicate state law
as the applicable law. While the same result obtains, the reasoning in
terms of competence obscures the true nature and range of maritime
jurisprudence. 241 By reversing the above reasoning, Jensen decided
that maritime law was uniform law and uniform workmen's compensation for longshoremen was needed; therefore, workmen's compensation for longshoremen was to be governed by maritime law. This,
however, is a confusion of the reason for having a federal maritime law
with the reason for having a uniform federal maritime law.2 4 2
The same confusion also works to produce the opposite result. For
example, the Court's decision in Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman'sFund
Insurance Co.243 -that state law governs the effect of warranties in
marine insurance policies-could have been made on the grounds that
the Court was without maritime competence, rather than on the
grounds cited by the Court-that the federal maritime choice of law
rule indicated that the state statute governed the transaction. The only
basis for denying the availability of the former reasoning was Justice
Story's prior opinion in De Lovio v. Boit,24 which held that a policy
of marine insurance was to be governed by maritime law. As a result,
the Wilburn Court was forced to adopt the latter reasoning.

238. See notes 215 & 216 supra.
239. Cf. Thames Towboat Co. v. The Schooner Francis McDonald, 254 U.S.
242 (1920).
240. The contract law of the states need not be uniform but the general
principles of contract interpretation are fairly uniform throughout the United
States. It is sufficiently uniform for Professor Corbin to write a treatise and find a
"majority" rule for any given proposition of law.
241. See text at p. 217 supra.
242. These same considerations apply to the decisions that ship's mortgages,
prior to the Ship Mortgage Act of 1920, were not maritime contracts. See, e.g.,
Bogart v. The John Jay, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 399 (1854).
243. 348 U.S. 310 (1955).
244. 7 F. Cas. 418 (No. 3,776) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815).
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In addition, the home port doctrine announced in The General

Smith2 4 5 and repudiated by the Federal Maritime Lien Act 2 4 6 was

not grounded on the theory that the Court lacked competence to
adjudicate the claim according to federal maritime law. Rather, it was
grounded on the theory that a maritime remedy-a libel in rem to
hypothecate the vessel-was not needed for supplies and repairs
furnished in the home port.
IV.

CONCLUSION

A court should have competence in admiralty to render a decision
in a particular case if the case concerns the needs and usages of
maritime commerce. The bases and range of federal maritime law
indicate that a case concerns the needs and usages of maritime
commerce if it is one in which the cause of action is based on a
relationship that is as follows:
(1) between two or more parties, one of whom is a carrier; and,
(2) that creates a consensual or legal obligation the object of
which is activity to regulate either the profits produced by
the use of the vessel or the losses to which the use of the
vessel is subject.
This proposed choice of law rule is articulated in accordance with the
five considerations set forth by Professor Leflar. 2 47 First, it is a rule
that achieves predictability of result, subject to the following caveats:
it reflects not what past courts have said, but rather what they have
done; and, often courts have confused maritime competence-whether
maritime law governs the cause-with the question whether maritime
law should be uniform in application. Secondly, the rule is formulated
with regard for the maintenance of interstate and international order.
The rule is an articulation of the bases and range of substantive
maritime law as it has developed to satisfy the needs of interstate and
international maritime commerce and order over almost one thousand
years. Thirdly, it is a rule that is simple to apply. The Court in Victory
Carriers applied the rule sub silentio and obtained the correct result

245. "The General Smith, which held that no lien is given by the general
maritime law for supplies and repairs furnished to a ship in her home port, runs
neck and neck with Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen... for the distinction of being
the most ill-advised admiralty decision ever handed down by the Supreme Court."
G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 10, at 526.
246. 46 U.S.C. § § 971 et seq. (1970).
247. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
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with a great deal more precision than heretofore witnessed in an
admiralty court. Fourthly, the rule advances the government's
interests in utilizing the federal maritime law, including federal
maritime choice of law rules, because it separates policy considerations regarding the use of the federal maritime law by the state and
federal courts from policy considerations regarding the use of the
particular rule of maritime law that will obtain uniform results.
Finally, the rule will point to the better rule of substantive law; for
purposes of choosing between federal maritime law and state or
federal common law, the better rule of substantive law is the rule that
accounts for the safety, convenience, needs and usages of maritime
commerce. It is upon this basis that the rules of general maritime law
were developed, and the choice of law rule proposed by this note is
based on the relationships governed by the substantive rules themselves.
Arthur R. Louv
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